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MORAL JUDGMENT AND PROFESSIONAL LEGITIMATION 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this essay I would like to consider the nature of the role of lawyers from 
the point of view of both jurisprudence and the sociology of professions.  From 
this perspective it is apparent that the judgment characteristic of lawyers’ 
expertise is not primarily the exercise of ethical discretion.  Rather, it is the 
application of legal norms, which may incorporate moral principles by 
reference, but which are analytically distinct from morality.  Much of the 
concern about lawyers “imposing their values” on clients, usurping clients’ 
decision-making authority, or acting as unelected priests of virtue seems to boil 
down to a deep-seated skepticism about the superior capacity of lawyers to 
make moral judgments, as compared with their clients.  Nevertheless, many 
legal ethics scholars maintain that “real” ethics, in the sense of a normative 
theory of the lawyer’s role apart from merely complying with the law 
governing lawyers,1 is primarily a matter of responding appropriately to the 
same sort of moral considerations that figure into the practical reasoning of 
 
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
 1. A short aside on terminology: Many lawyers use the term “legal ethics” to refer to the 
disciplinary rules adopted by the highest court of a state and enforced through grievance 
procedures (often administered by bar associations exercising delegated powers).  Thus, in 
common parlance lawyers say something is unethical when it violates a disciplinary rule or that 
they have an ethical obligation to do such-and-such when it is required by a rule.  The 
disciplinary rules are part of the broader subject of the law governing lawyers, which also 
includes the law of agency, torts, contracts, procedure, crimes, and specialized areas such as tax 
and securities law, as they apply to the activities of lawyers.  The teaching of law school 
professional responsibility courses has increasingly emphasized the overlapping sources of 
regulation to which lawyers are subject, and the leading casebooks and treatises now deal with 
much more than just the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (upon which the disciplinary rules of most states are based).  The usage of the word 
“ethics” to refer to the disciplinary rules creates unnecessary confusion with the notion of ethics 
as a theoretical inquiry into how one ought to live one’s life.  In particular, the philosophical 
discipline of normative ethics asks what kinds of actions are right or wrong, and what kind of a 
life should one lead.  See David Copp, Introduction: Normative Ethics and Metaethics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 3, 19 (2006).  When I talk about ethical obligations, 
values, principles, etc., I will always be referring to philosophical ethics, not the disciplinary 
rules. 
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agents in ordinary life.  David Luban and Deborah Rhode, for example, have 
argued that lawyers ought to accept personal moral responsibility for their 
actions, even when acting in a representative capacity.2  If they are correct 
about this, the task of legal education, and specifically of legal ethics 
education, might include training lawyers to be better at making moral 
judgments.  In fact, there has been a fairly persistent (if minority) view that law 
schools should assume some responsibility for improving the ethical decision-
making capacities of students.3  On this view, the interesting pedagogical 
question is how this should best be accomplished, with advocates tending to 
favor “experiential” learning environments such as simulations, live-client 
clinics, and pro bono representation.4  The traditional doctrinal law school 
course, complete with casebooks and Socratic questioning, certainly does not 
appear to have much to recommend, from the point of view of training better 
moral decision-makers. 
 
 2. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160–74 (1988); 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 17 
(2000) (arguing that lawyers should take “personal moral responsibility for the consequences of 
their professional acts”); David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-
Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1990) 
(“Morally activist lawyers hold themselves morally accountable for the means they employ and 
the ends they pursue on behalf of clients.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Tom C. Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 
(1975); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 605 (1996); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO 
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP 203, Skill § 10 (1992) (known as the MacCrate Report; recognizing ethical 
dilemmas is one skill that a competent lawyer must possess).  The treatment of ethics by the 
MacCrate Report is disappointing, because it never resolves the ambiguity between ethics in the 
sense of the disciplinary rules and ethics as moral decision-making.  For example, Skill § 
10.1(b)(i)–(ii) talks about familiarity with primary sources of “ethical rules,” including the 
disciplinary rules and other sources of the law governing lawyers, while Skill § 10.1(b)(v)–(vi) 
refers to “[a]spects of ethical philosophy bearing upon the propriety of particular practices or 
conduct” as well as “[a] lawyer’s personal sense of morality.”  Id. at 203–05. 
 4. See, e.g., Robert P. Burns, Legal Ethics in Preparation for Law Practice, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 684, 695–96 (1996); Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro 
Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695 (1993); Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of 
Clinical Legal Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER 317 (David Luban ed., 1984); Stephen Gillers, 
Getting Personal, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61 (1995); Carol Bensinger Liebman, The 
Profession of Law: Columbia Law School’s Use of Experiential Learning Techniques to Teach 
Professional Responsibility, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1995); James E. Moliterno, Legal 
Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 
(1996); Shaffer, supra note 3, at 608–09. 
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As strange as it may sound to tell future lawyers that they should not act on 
the basis of their principled moral convictions,5 I believe that lawyers in fact 
should refrain from exercising moral judgment on the basis of non-legal 
values.  Legal ethics differs in kind from ordinary ethics because the social 
function of the law is to settle normative disagreement procedurally and to 
adopt a provisional social settlement of moral conflict that precludes acting on 
the basis of ordinary first-order moral reasons.  Because lawyers acting in a 
representative capacity are agents for their clients, they can have no rights 
greater than those provided by their clients’ legal entitlements and those rights 
conferred by agency law.  Agency law vests the authority in the client to 
determine the objectives of the representation and, implicitly, to judge the 
moral worth of her own project.  If the lawyer has agreed to represent a client, 
the lawyer’s moral qualms about the client’s goals are simply irrelevant to the 
lawyer’s professionally prescribed duties of assisting the client in carrying 
them out using lawful means.  In my view, even the decision whether to 
represent a particular client, which in American law is almost entirely 
discretionary with the lawyer, should be made with due recognition of the 
importance of the social value of legality, and should not be influenced by the 
lawyer’s moral disagreement with the client, except in unusual circumstances.6  
This conclusion is supported not only by the conceptual argument just 
suggested, relying on the social function of law, but also by the implicit 
contract between the legal profession and society as a whole.  This tacit 
agreement establishes certain privileges for the legal profession, including a 
valuable monopoly over the provision of what are deemed to be “legal” 
services, in exchange for an undertaking by the profession to use its expertise 
for the benefit of society.  Notwithstanding occasional rhetorical flourishes by 
leaders of the organized bar, the legal profession has never seriously claimed 
that its members should be regarded as moral experts. 
Other than the clergy, no profession in modern society makes the claim to 
be better at making moral decisions than its clients (and of course even the 
clergy’s claim is bitterly contested).  Although law is a richly normative 
domain, full of value-laden concepts like fairness, loyalty, dignity, autonomy, 
well-being, reasonable care, and good faith, lawyers understand these concepts 
to have specific legal meanings, as terms of art.  Karl Llewellyn may have 
 
 5. Cf. RHODE, supra note 2, at 58 (arguing that lawyers should “act on the basis of their 
principled convictions, even when they recognize that others could in good faith hold different 
views”). 
 6. See W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The 
Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (2006).  At several points in this essay I 
cite papers I have written, not because I believe my own work to be authoritative as such, but as a 
way of referring to lengthier arguments in support of some of the points made here.  My views on 
teaching legal ethics depend on my position on the nature of the subject itself, which can only be 
briefly summarized here. 
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poured it on a bit thick when he said, in a lecture to beginning law students that 
the job of the first year of law school is “to knock your ethics into temporary 
anesthesia. . . . along with woozy thinking,” but he was making an important 
conceptual point, that law school aims to teach how to “work within a body of 
materials that is given.”7  Ethics and law are “given” in a different way, and the 
working material of lawyers is that which is deemed relevant by the 
professional community to the process of legal interpretation.8  Other ethical 
values are familiar in legal reasoning in the guise of rationales for judicial 
decisions or the policies underlying legal norms, which help give content to the 
norms and guide their application.  Even if they have analogues in ordinary 
moral life, however, these legal policy/moral concepts and values take on a 
specific meaning in legal contexts, which is all that lawyers are professionally 
concerned with.  Of course lawyers remain moral agents even when acting in a 
professional capacity, but their non-legal moral beliefs should not be permitted 
to influence their interpretation and application of legal norms. 
The following section sets out briefly the sociological and jurisprudential 
arguments for constructing a technical domain of professional expertise for 
lawyers, separate from the practices of ordinary moral reasoning.  If that 
argument is successful, then the implication for the teaching of legal ethics is 
that a law school legal ethics course should focus on the values of lawyering 
that are imminent within the law governing lawyers—values such as fiduciary 
obligation and candor to third parties—and not purport to address the way 
people make moral judgments in ordinary life.  Consideration of ethics in this 
way would be no different than talking about the value of efficiency in a torts 
class or the duty of loyalty in corporate law.  These are no less “values” for 
being incorporated into legal reasoning, but they are not distinctive as part of 
some special domain of “ethics” either.  Classroom teachers in law schools can 
handle legal ethics in the same way as they treat any other policy discussion.  
In my view, the discipline of legal ethics has suffered from self-imposed 
mystification that relies upon an implicit belief that ethical reasoning for 
lawyers is a skill that cannot be taught in traditional law school courses.  
Perhaps ethical reasoning in general cannot be taught—I am actually agnostic 
on whether this is so—but for the purposes of training lawyers, ordinary 
classroom faculty are perfectly competent to handle the task. 
 
 7. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 116 (Oceana 
Publ’ns 1996) (1930). 
 8. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 
(2005). 
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II.  THE EXPERTISE OF LAWYERS 
One of the central issues in the theory of professions is the nature of 
legitimation.  Professions claim privileges vis-à-vis the state and other social 
institutions—they define the nature of their work, restrict entry, regulate 
themselves, and enlist the assistance of the state to limit competition from 
other service providers.9  As a consequence, professions are relatively 
insulated from both political pressure (through regulation by politically 
responsive branches) and market forces.  These prerogatives, which have 
usefully been labeled “guild power,”10 obviously require some sort of 
justification in terms of values that have some currency in the broader society 
in which the profession is embedded.  The standard justification of the 
professional monopoly has several independent branches.11  The first is 
pragmatic: Self-regulation is a consequence of the difficulty in evaluating the 
performance of professionals—if a great deal of training and experience is 
required to discern problems requiring the application of professional judgment 
and to judge the best way to solve them, then only other professionals are 
competent to evaluate the performance of tasks within the professional domain.  
The second branch is more explicitly normative: Professions claim that the 
ends served by a profession are socially valuable.12  Health in the case of 
medicine, justice in the case of law, spiritual guidance in the case of the clergy, 
and so on, are the sorts of goods that a society would like to see produced.  The 
pragmatic and normative branches are then melded in the argument that 
insulation from competitive and regulatory pressures is necessary in order to 
create the conditions under which these valuable ends will be served.13 
I am interested in a variation on this pattern of legitimation, associated 
with the Weberian tradition in sociology, in which professions claim rational, 
 
 9. See RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE 
POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 471 (2003). 
 10. ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE 
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT passim (1996). 
 11. See Eliot Friedson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS / 
LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215 (Robert 
L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
 12. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 184–86 (1988). 
 13. See, e.g., TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND 
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 34 (1987) (“When each profession is pressed back to the bedrock 
of its authority, when its legitimacy is questioned at the most generic level, at that point 
professions retreat ultimately to the distinctive means by which their knowledge is created and the 
distinctive class of statements produced by that means.”); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE 
OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 23 (1977) (“[O]nly in a quasi-monopolistic 
situation can the producers be supervised and a minimum of ‘professional’ competence 
obtained.”). 
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value-free, “scientific” competence over some domain of technical problems.14  
The Weberian conception of expertise insists that the application of 
professional skill be value-free, neutral, and objective.15  Claiming that 
professional knowledge is neutral and scientific connects the profession with 
highly culturally salient values of technical expertise and objectivity.16  To 
modern American ears, the equation of law with science sounds anachronistic, 
associated as it is with Langdell’s pedagogical innovations and a long-
discredited view of adjudication as the mechanical application of formal 
norms.  The vast majority of the world’s lawyers, however, work within the 
civil law tradition in which the logical, formal, scientific rationality of law is 
taken as given, at least in the rhetoric of legal education and legal 
scholarship.17  And even within the American profession there are vestiges of 
the Weberian idea that legal professionalism is primarily a matter of neutral 
technical expertise.  A study conducted by several prominent legal sociologists 
for the American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Litigation revealed a 
pervasive attitude among large-firm litigators that moral dialogue with clients 
and making moral judgments in connection with representation were simply 
not a feature of the professional role.18  In response to interviews based on 
hypothetical scenarios (including the well known Fisons discovery abuse 
case), partners and associates interviewed made comments such as: 
I personally would have a problem even conveying my own view of the 
morality of the situation to a client.  I think morality is a very slippery concept, 
primarily in the eye of the beholder. 
I don’t think there’s really a market at this point for being an incredibly ethical 
lawyer. 
[The client] can go [to] his minister if he wants moral advice.  That’s not why 
he’s coming to you. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Sociology of 
Lawyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 478, 502–04 (Richard L. Abel & 
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1989); Robert Granfield, Lawyers and Power: Reproduction and 
Resistance in the Legal Profession, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 205, 207–08 (1996) (reviewing 
RONAN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995)). 
 15. See Granfield, supra note 14, at 207. 
 16. ABBOTT, supra note 12, at 53–54; LARSON, supra note 13, at 22, 40–42. 
 17. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 61–67 (2d ed. 1985). 
 18. See Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Introduction, Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of 
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1998). 
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What you are really talking around here is in fact a fundamental precept of the 
profession, . . . that clients . . . are entitled to representation by trained and 
skilled individuals who operate within the system.19 
Although big-firm lawyers probably like to affect an attitude of world-weary 
cynicism, these comments do reflect a sense that their job is too highly 
complex, technical, and value-free, and that the moral issues raised by their 
work are simply someone else’s problem.20  If the work of lawyers was 
inextricably bound up with contestable moral and political values, however, 
one might be concerned that the profession was acting as a kind of anti-
democratic elite, either by restricting access to its services to those clients 
deemed “worthy”21 or by manipulating the legal process to favor the interests 
of the powerful.22  In other words, the equation of legal judgment with neutral, 
technical expertise buttresses the case for the professional monopoly, because 
lawyers are not claiming the authority to perform tasks (e.g., exercise moral 
judgment) that ordinary people are able to do for themselves. 
All of this is familiar, even banal.  Despite the pervasiveness among 
practicing lawyers of this Weberian stance toward their work, it is now taken 
for granted among most professional responsibility teachers that the role of a 
lawyer requires the exercise of moral discretion.  In fact, a common line of 
criticism leveled against the standard professional responsibility curriculum, 
consisting of the ABA’s Model Rules and cases applying them, is that it 
 
 19. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, 
Professional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and 
Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 778–80 (1998). 
 20. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 
1, 8 (1975).  Wasserstrom described, but did not endorse the received view among lawyers that 
[t]he job of the lawyer . . . is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her 
client, the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer’s assistance, or the avenues 
provided by the law to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish.  The lawyer’s 
task is, instead, to provide that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as 
professional, possesses. 
Id.  For a strong statement of the view Wasserstrom describes, see Lee Modjeska, On Teaching 
Morality to Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 73 (1991) (disapproving, in hindsight, his own 
moral advice to a client not to throw employees out of work on Christmas Eve, and stating that 
his own professional competence was questionable since he dared suggest that the client’s 
business plan might be morally problematic).  Modjeska’s self-flagellation is unwarranted, 
because the lawyer’s role clearly permits advising clients on the basis of non-legal considerations 
“such as moral, economic, social and political factors.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.  
2.1 (2007). 
 21. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and 
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (expressing concern about rule by an 
“oligarchy of lawyers”). 
 22. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 19 (1989) (“Despite the efforts of 
lawyers to portray law as a logically deductive system, the public clearly sees it as a human 
construct and thus a reflection of political power.”). 
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squeezes the ethics out of what should be a rich normative domain.23  
(Teachers who are criticized for teaching primarily the law of lawyering may 
be reacting to the implicit hierarchy of the curriculum constructed by law 
students, who consider doctrinal courses more “real” or legitimate than 
interdisciplinary offerings.24)  By beginning with the problem of professional 
legitimation, however, we can ask why this must be so, and further we can 
look more closely at the jurisprudential basis for the belief that teaching 
lawyers involves teaching something about the making of moral judgments.  
My claim is, perhaps surprisingly, a variation on the idea that professional 
expertise is primarily technical, gaining its legitimacy from its neutrality and 
objectivity.  By this I do not mean that legal norms are devoid of moral 
content, only that moral principles must be incorporated into legal norms 
somehow in order to be the sort of things that lawyers are permitted to consider 
when acting in a representative capacity.25  Nor does this mean that lawyers 
cannot engage their clients in a moral dialogue; counseling on non-legal 
matters is permitted by the law of lawyering as well as long professional 
tradition.26  In my view, however, the authority of law is dependent on its 
capacity to supersede moral controversy and establish a relatively stable basis 
for peaceful coexistence and cooperative activity among people who disagree 
profoundly at the level of first-order ethical principles.27  It follows that the 
role of lawyers is twofold: to enable citizens to coordinate their activities with 
others using an orderly framework, and to maintain the legal system in a 
healthy, functioning state and not undermine the settlement achieved by the 
law through evasion or manipulation. 
The alternative to this conception of lawyering, which would require 
lawyers to make moral judgments, would have to build in ethical discretion at 
 
 23. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 963 (1987); William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEG. EDUC. 65 
(1991). 
 24. See, e.g., Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A 
Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247. 
 25. See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005). 
 26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007).  I have referred to this as 
“freestanding moral advice.”  See Wendel, supra note 25, at 110–12.  Regarding professional 
tradition, here is the place for the obligatory cite to the quote from Elihu Root, that “half the 
practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and 
should stop.”  See PHILIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938); see also Amy Gutmann, Can 
Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759 (1993) (recommending that lawyers be 
prepared to deliberate with their clients about what is right, rather than either refusing to do 
wrong or attempting to manipulate the client into doing the right thing); Pepper, supra note 21, at 
630–32 (encouraging lawyers to engage clients in moral dialogue). 
 27. See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004). 
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either of two points.  Either (1) the client has a legal entitlement but it is 
morally problematic, or (2) the existence of the client’s legal entitlement 
depends on a moral judgment.  The first alternative undermines the 
profession’s claimed basis of legitimacy, while the second raises serious 
jurisprudential problems.  Regarding (1), there are undoubtedly many legal 
entitlements which legally permit a person to do something that is morally 
wrong.28  The proverbial case of throwing workers out of a job on Christmas 
Eve is such an example.29  There seems to be no harm in permitting lawyers—
or anyone, for that matter—to try to argue another person out of a morally 
wrongful course of action.  As noted above, the law governing lawyers 
expressly permits lawyers to seek to persuade their clients to modify their 
actions in light of moral concerns.30  However, it is not necessarily an 
implication of the permissibility of offering moral advice that lawyers ought to 
conceive moral advising as a significant aspect of their role, nor that legal 
educators should be concerned with training lawyers to be better moral 
decision-makers. 
The spheres of authority of professionals can be divided into technical 
authority and normative domains, differentiating for example between how 
best to build a road (a question within the technical authority of engineers) and 
whether a particular road should be built (a policy question perhaps within the 
moral authority of policy and planning experts).31  For any given profession, 
there is accordingly a jurisdictional question concerning the scope of its 
authority, the answer to which “rests significantly on [its] epistemological 
foundations.”32  Having secure epistemological foundations for expertise is a 
function both of the subject itself and the ability to train people to use that 
knowledge.  If most moral decision-making by lawyers related to category (1), 
legal but immoral acts by clients, lawyers should be expected to demonstrate 
both a sufficiently objective moral epistemology and their superior capacity for 
making moral judgments.  Otherwise these judgments should not be committed 
to professionals, but should be reserved to the clients themselves, because 
lawyers act as agents of clients and their legal authority is derivative of the 
legal entitlements of clients.  And indeed as a matter of agency law, the 
normative domain of authority is regarded as the client’s alone, leaving the 
lawyer with authority over technical matters.33  If a client wishes to do 
 
 28. See Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21 (1981). 
 29. See Modjeska, supra note 20, at 73. 
 30. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., HALLIDAY, supra note 13, at 38–39.  I use the term normative instead of 
Halliday’s term “moral,” because many non-technical judgments made by experts rely on non-
moral norms such as efficiency. 
 32. Id. at 40. 
 33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21(3) & cmts. d & e 
(2000). 
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something legal but immoral, the lawyer’s role is arguably only to provide the 
means for accomplishing the client’s goal, at least after attempts at counseling 
and persuasion have failed.34  In other words, the normative question—
analogous to “Should this road be built?”—is one on which we do not believe 
lawyers have comparatively greater expertise.35 
As a theoretical matter, this allocation of authority presupposes certain 
assumptions about ethical reasoning and the nature of objectivity in ethics, and 
the nature of the expertise of lawyers.  In particular, it assumes that lawyers do 
not have special competence at discovering ethical truths.36  The situation 
would be different if Kant’s dream were realized, in which reason itself 
demanded obedience to certain moral principles, the content of which was 
apparent to all rational beings.37  However, common experience leads us to 
question whether Kant’s dream will ever be anything other than an ideal at 
which philosophical ethics may aim.  For any interesting moral issue—say, 
capital punishment, abortion, stem-cell research, affirmative action, racial 
profiling, or the permissibility of coercive interrogation techniques—people 
appear to continue to disagree in good faith about what morality permits or 
requires.  Disagreement alone does not necessarily imply anything about the 
nature of ethical reasoning, but it would be surprising if there were a reliable 
moral epistemology for discovering and verifying the existence of moral facts, 
 
 34. I say “arguably” because lawyers have discretion not to represent particular clients.  See 
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 571, § 10.2.2 (1986).  Once the representation 
has begun, a lawyer also has discretion to withdraw from representing a client if the lawyer finds 
the client’s goals repugnant.  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2007).  
As I have argued elsewhere, however, the law of lawyering contains an implicit cab-rank 
principle that morally motivated refusals to represent clients (or to withdraw from representation) 
should be reserved only for extreme cases in which the lawyer’s disagreement with the client’s 
goals is so fundamental that the lawyer is in effect rendered incompetent to provide effective 
representation.  See Wendel, supra note 6, at 998–1000. 
 35. Cf. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1080 (1976) (“In a democratic society, justice has no anointed 
priests.  Every citizen has the same duty to work for the establishment of just institutions, and the 
lawyer has no special moral responsibilities in that regard.”). 
 36. William Simon performs a nice theoretical reversal on defenders of the standard 
libertarian view of legal ethics by conceding that lawyers do not necessarily have greater 
expertise in moral reasoning as compared with their clients, but then locating the relevant ethical 
values within the domain of law, in which lawyers do have comparatively greater expertise.  See 
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1113–14 (1988).  
Simon is also correct that distinctions between spheres of technical and normative authority 
“depend on important issues of legal theory that all lawyers need to resolve.”  Id. at 1114.  A 
great deal of my own recent work is aimed at understanding the legal theoretic questions raised 
by the distinction between moral and legal obligation. 
 37. See SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING 
214–16 (1998) (using the metaphor of Kant’s dream to describe the ideal of ethics as stating 
authoritative, compulsory principles that are binding on all rational beings in virtue of their 
rationality). 
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yet we have not yet seen the effects of its use.  The hypothesis more consistent 
with the evidence seems to be that even if there are facts about the world that 
warrant the truth of propositions of ethics, “there is no privileged, easy, or 
uncontroversial access to them; there is certainly no mode of belief which is 
straightforwardly and indubitably reflective of the facts’ solidity.”38  Moreover, 
even if Kant’s dream came true for all rational beings, there would be no 
reason to commit ethical decision-making to lawyers, unless legal education 
somehow made lawyers better at engaging in the reasoning process that led to 
the discovery of ethical truths. 
There is much more that can be said here, apropos of the nature of ethical 
reasoning, and particularly the case for pluralism as opposed to skepticism or 
relativism.  However, there is room here only to summarize briefly.  In my 
view, the persistence of moral controversy is not the result of any dysfunction 
in ethical reasoning, but of the structure of value itself, with its diversity of 
authentically valuable human goods and forms of life.  This is a well known 
position in political theory, and it is making inroads in the theory of legal 
ethics.39  What may not be fully appreciated, however, is the necessity of the 
connection between some degree of value pluralism and the arguments that are 
often given in support of the technocratic, value-neutral, Weberian conception 
of lawyering expertise we are considering here.  The familiar libertarian 
defense of this conception, offered by Stephen Pepper, Monroe Freedman, and 
others, is that clients should have the autonomy to arrange their affairs and 
dealings with others in any way they see fit, subject only to the constraints of 
positive law, enacted through legitimate processes.40  This argument is subject 
to a number of familiar objections: clients are entitled only to a just measure of 
autonomy, autonomously chosen ends are valuable only if the ends themselves 
are valuable, and even if autonomy has some positive value, helping someone 
exercise autonomy to do something bad is not turned into a morally 
 
 38. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 175 (1999). 
 39. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 21–26 
(1996); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 30–33 (1989); CHARLES E. 
LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (1987); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: 
A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 6–11 (2d ed. 1984); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54–58 
(1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322–66 (1986); Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of 
the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1–2 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991); THOMAS 
NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128–41 (1979).  For other scholars 
considering the implications of value pluralism in legal ethics, see, for example, Katherine R. 
Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005); 
Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995). 
 40. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 1.05 
(2d ed. 2002); Pepper, supra note 21, at 616–17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1082 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1071 
praiseworthy act by the presence of the positive value of autonomy.41  I think a 
stronger case can be made, however, if autonomy is understood as a 
consequence of the plurality of worthwhile forms of life and conceptions of the 
good.  As Joseph Raz has pointed out, “Autonomy requires that many morally 
acceptable options be available to a person.”42  In addition, there must be some 
reason to choose among these various options—being able to choose between 
two identical things is not autonomy.43  This means that autonomy necessarily 
involves tradeoffs between things that have value, which is to say choices that 
different people might make differently, even if both were deliberating 
carefully and acting in good faith. 
The implication for legal ethics is when lawyers are acting in a 
representative capacity, where legal entitlements to morally wrongful conduct 
are concerned, they must be careful not to interfere with their clients’ 
autonomy to do things that they would regard as wrongful, from the point of 
view of their own value commitments and form of life.  A lawyer’s moral 
integrity, in the sense of her own ideals and ambitions that constitute the form 
of life she aims to live by,44 is not the source of value in the lawyer-client 
relationship.  Rather, the moral worth of the relationship is based on the 
legitimacy of the law from the point of view of citizens.  The law establishes at 
least a provisional settlement of normative conflict that is sufficiently stable 
and clear that it provides the basis for coordinated action despite what would 
otherwise be interminable moral conflict.  For example, citizens and 
government officials may disagree in good faith about what sorts of 
interrogation techniques are permissible when dealing with members of a 
group that pose a serious threat to national security.45  Is it permissible to force 
prisoners to stand in uncomfortable positions, bombard them with sound and 
light, or trick them into believing that they have been handed over to foreign 
security forces who are known for their ruthlessness?  In a situation like this, it 
is apparent that even sincere, well-meaning people deliberating in good faith 
are unlikely to reach agreement at the level of specificity that is needed.  (It is 
not enough to say that interrogations must respect the human rights of 
detainees—what those rights require is exactly what interrogators want to 
 
 41. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 166–69 (1988); 
WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 26–52 (1998); 
Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ 
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 47 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); David 
Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 637 (1986). 
 42. RAZ, supra note 39, at 378. 
 43. Id. at 398. 
 44. See Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 209, 238–39 (2003). 
 45. For this example, see Wendel, supra note 25, at 93–98. 
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know.)  In addition, it is apparent that something must be done, and if there is 
no agreement on what ought to be done, then interrogators will be acting 
without guidance.  Despite the lack of agreement on substance, it may be 
possible to reach agreement on a fair procedure that can be used to construct a 
normative framework for action, which is good enough, for now, to 
accomplish the goal that everyone shares—namely, of defending national 
security while respecting the human rights of detainees. 
A significant implication of this proceduralist view of legal legitimacy is 
that the moral beliefs of lawyers, or any citizens for that matter, are treated as a 
contribution to a conversation or positions in a debate, but are never allowed to 
conclusively resolve the disagreement.  Resolution falls to procedures adopted 
in the name of society as a whole, designed to reach a provisional settlement.  
After that settlement has been reached, lawyers as interpreters and 
implementers of law have an obligation not to “unsettle the settlement” by re-
introducing contested moral beliefs into the process of interpretation.  This 
raises the second possibility, considered above, namely whether moral 
judgment may be necessary to determine whether a client has a legal 
entitlement.46  If the law is to fulfill its role of settling moral conflict and 
providing a stable basis for cooperative activity, it must be possible to identify 
the law without reference to contested moral issues.47  This does not mean that 
moral values can never be incorporated into law.48  In fact, moral concepts like 
reasonable care, good faith and fair dealing, and loyalty to shareholders are 
perfectly familiar to lawyers.  Significantly, however, they are familiar as legal 
concepts.  Failing to exercise reasonable care for the purposes of tort liability 
may be different from the kind of failure of caring that would make a person 
morally blameworthy.  (A clear illustration of this distinction is the lack of a 
 
 46. For more on the relationship between moral reasons and legal entitlements, see id. at 
100–09. 
 47. See, e.g., ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 
53 (1992). 
 48. Raz insists that moral values are not incorporated into law merely because decision-
makers take them into account; human decision-makers must take moral reasons into account in 
any case.  See Joseph Raz, Incorporation By Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004).  This may be true 
in the first instance of would-be incorporation, but once a moral reason is given in justification of 
a legal judgment, it becomes relevant to ascertaining the law in future cases.  In common law 
reasoning, determining the holding of a case requires understanding the reasons behind the 
judgment, which may be pragmatic (as in concerns about the administrability of a rule), 
hermeneutic (as where the interpretation of a precedent was an issue in the case), or moral.  All of 
these styles of reasoning have analogues in ordinary practical and moral life, but when employed 
by judges they have a distinctively legal form.  In the end I do not think anything of importance 
turns on the term “incorporation,” as long as we recognize that the law makes use of concepts that 
have exact equivalents or at least analogues in ordinary moral reasoning, but that legal 
interpretation takes them into account only insofar as they feature in the practice of justifying 
legal judgments. 
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legal duty to rescue someone in peril, which may be morally required in many 
circumstances.)49  The concept of taking care may develop different contours 
in law and morality, and require different conduct from those subject to legal 
and moral duties.  Another example of this distinction between moral and legal 
obligation is the legal ethics classic Zabella v. Pakel,50 in which a wealthy man 
asserted the statute of limitations to avoid paying a debt he clearly (morally, 
justly) owed to a less fortunate plaintiff.51 
Even if moral principles and legal principles require identical actions in a 
given case, the nature and source of the duties are still analytically distinct.52  
The most important difference is that if a moral principle is incorporated into 
law, it is not necessary to ascertain the truth of the principle to determine 
whether one has a (legal) obligation to act.  So, if a court permits recovery of 
damages for emotional distress on the grounds that the defendant’s conduct 
was “extreme and outrageous,”53 a lawyer interpreting that case does not ask 
whether the defendant’s conduct was really extreme and outrageous.  In the 
same vein, if a citizen sincerely believes, on the basis of moral reflection, that 
the conduct was not extreme and outrageous, she is not thereby legally entitled 
to engage in it.  Obligation, for both citizens and lawyers, is not a result of the 
direct impact of morality, but of morality filtered through law—with a certain 
legal “pedigree,” as Dworkin would put it.54  To put it extremely, simply, and 
schematically, outrageousness as a moral concept (call it OM) creates moral 
obligations not to do certain things, while outrageousness as a legal concept 
(call it OL), which may overlap to a greater or lesser extent with OM, creates 
legal obligations not to do other things.  The recognition that something is 
outrageous creates an obligation not to inflict mental suffering and humiliation 
on another person, but there are different obligations in virtue of the legal and 
moral values of outrageousness.  If OM and OL both require something—say, 
employers to refrain from using racial epithets to describe employees55—then a 
citizen has a moral and legal obligation not to use racial epithets.  On the other 
hand, there may be cases in which OM forbids something that OL permits, such 
as the use of racial epithets in non-employment contexts.56  Although there is 
 
 49. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1981). 
 50. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957). 
 51. Id. at 455. 
 52. For contrasting theories both accepting the analytic separability of law and morality—
i.e., the claim of legal positivism—see JULES COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in 
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3–27 (1988); JOSEPH RAZ, The Problem About the Nature of 
Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 194–221 (1994). 
 53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
 54. See RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14–23 
(1977). 
 55. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998). 
 56. See, e.g., Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] MORAL JUDGMENT AND PROFESSIONAL LEGITIMATION 1085 
probably little moral disagreement that the use of racial epithets is wrong, the 
law of torts has for various reasons (including the difficulty of drawing bright 
lines in this area and a general aversion to the litigation of non-physical harms) 
declined to impose legal liability on people who engage in this conduct.  Thus, 
on the fanciful assumption that a client has come to a lawyer to find out 
whether it is legally permissible to use a particular term (perhaps in a public 
performance or a newspaper article), the answer would depend on whether the 
proposed course of action was outrageous in the sense of exhibiting OL.  The 
lawyer may also offer freestanding moral advice, based on the lawyer’s best 
understanding of OM, but this would be irrelevant to the client’s question 
regarding legal permission.57  The client may appreciate the freestanding moral 
advice or may resent it, but in any event the legal profession does not seek to 
justify its monopoly over the provision of certain kinds of services, namely 
giving legal advice, with reference to the expertise of lawyers in making moral 
judgments. 
I do not deny the possibility that a lawyer may sincerely believe that 
assisting her client in realizing her legal entitlements may implicate the lawyer 
in moral wrongdoing by the client.58  As a matter of practical reasoning, the 
lawyer should regard the law as an authoritative source of obligations, except 
in the most extreme cases of grossly immoral laws.  Agency law, which creates 
the lawyers’ obligation to carry out the client’s lawful instructions, together 
with the client’s legal entitlement, creates a duty to participate in conduct that 
is legal but morally wrong from the lawyer’s point of view.  However, as a 
matter of theoretical reasoning, a lawyer may continue to believe that the 
action, though obligatory, is wrong.  The possibility of viewing an act from 
multiple perspectives—required by practical reasoning but viewed to be wrong 
from the theoretical point of view—may strike some as incoherent, but I 
believe it is one way of recognizing the weight and persistence of moral values 
that arise from social roles and ordinary pre-social morality.  Although I have 
argued that, as a matter of practical reasoning, the authority of law operates as 
an exclusionary reason vis-à-vis ordinary morality,59 that does not mean that 
ordinary moral reasons just vanish into the ether.  As Gerald Postema states: 
[I]t is not enough for one to work out the correct course of action and pursue it.  
It is also important that one appreciate the moral costs of that course of action.  
 
 57. As I have argued elsewhere, the law can create legal obligations where moral obligations 
are absent, and even where most people making “all-things-considered” moral judgments would 
agree that a person has no such moral obligation.  See W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, 
and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006) (discussing hypothetical from 
Frederick Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 495, 499–501 (1994)). 
 58. The discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility 
in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980). 
 59. See Wendel, supra note 27. 
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This appreciation will be expressed in a genuine reluctance to bring about the 
injury, and a sense of the accompanying loss or sacrifice.60 
The law and traditions governing the attorney-client relationship do permit the 
lawyer to discuss these “moral costs” with the client, but to emphasize, if the 
client instructs the lawyer to assist the client in a lawful course of action, the 
lawyer must comply.  But the lawyer may do so with an accompanying feeling 
of regret, as a moral sentiment appropriate to having participated in justified 
wrongdoing.  Indeed, we may judge a lawyer who does not experience the 
appropriate sentiment as being somehow deficient in character. 
Postema worries that a lawyer will be less skillful as a lawyer if she 
becomes accustomed to making judgments that are detached from their sources 
in ordinary moral experience, beliefs, and attitudes.61  In his view, lawyers are 
often called upon to use their moral faculties, deliberate, reason, and argue 
about matters related to justice.  Thus, he rejects conceiving of legal ethics as 
“the artificial reason of professional morality, which rests on claims of 
specialized knowledge and specialize analytical technique.”62  In other words, 
he resists the Weberian conception I have been defending.  It is true that 
lawyers make arguments in the public sphere on matters concerning morals 
and justice.  But I am willing to bite the bullet and say that these arguments do 
pertain to an artificial kind of justice—the justice which represents the agreed-
up provisional settlement of normative conflict.63  We cannot build up 
professional ethics on a foundation of “real” justice, because it is too 
contestable.  Lawyers could never facilitate the effective functioning of a 
large-scale cooperative scheme if professional ethics were completely 
transparent, as it were, to ordinary moral scrutiny, so that professional 
obligations were genuinely binding only and to the extent that they overlapped 
with ordinary moral duties.  As for the argument that this artificial morality 
cuts lawyers off from resources they need to fashion arguments regarding 
client rights and duties,64 it is actually an important part of the professional 
judgment of lawyers to be able to distinguish between ordinary moral notions 
(justice, reasonable care, etc.) and legal concepts.  Lawyers who participate in 
the argumentative practices of this artificial universe may lose sensitivity to the 
costs of their actions in ordinary moral terms.  That is a serious problem for 
professional ethics, but it does not threaten the competence of lawyers as 
lawyers; rather, it makes it essential for lawyers to continue to engage in 
theoretical as well as practical reasoning about moral problems. 
 
 60. Postema, supra note 58, at 70. 
 61. Id. at 75–76, 79. 
 62. Id. at 76. 
 63. Cf. Fried, supra note 35, at 1084 (“[O]ne must not transfer uncritically the whole range 
of personal moral scruples into the arena of [the attorney-client relationship.]”). 
 64. Postema, supra note 58, at 79. 
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III.  RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL ETHICS 
The Weberian conception of professional expertise defended in Part II 
does not incorporate moral judgment as a significant component of the 
structure of the lawyer-client relationship.  As I have argued elsewhere, there is 
a difference between justifying institutions and practices as a whole, and 
justifying actions falling within those practices.65  If there are good moral 
reasons for citizens and lawyers to respect the settlement achieved by the law, 
which permits coordinated action despite moral disagreement, then citizens 
and lawyers have a moral obligation to do what is legally required in a given 
case, even if they believe this requirement does not overlap with the 
requirements of ordinary morality.  Judgments that look moral (e.g., “the 
directors violated their duty of loyalty to shareholders”) are actually legal 
judgments when the relevant moral norms are incorporated into the law.  
Therefore, when acting in a representative capacity, a lawyer is not engaged in 
making ordinary moral judgments, except in highly unusual circumstances.66 
That does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as legal ethics, 
apart from the disciplinary rules and the broader law governing lawyers.  The 
function of law creates a strong obligation, as part of the role of a lawyer, to 
treat the law as a social achievement worthy of respect and fidelity, not merely 
an inconvenient obstacle to be planned around in pursuit of the client’s ends.  I 
have argued that in several recent high-profile legal ethics scandals—including 
the Enron collapse, the marketing of fraudulent tax shelter opinions, and the 
approval by government lawyers of the use of torture in the interrogation of 
detainees—the principal ethical dereliction was the failure of lawyers to 
interpret legal norms in good faith, with due respect for the meaning of the 
law, considered from a relatively objective and impartial point of view.67  That 
is the violation of an ethical obligation, but not one that arises from ordinary 
moral values.  Rather, the duty arises from the recognition of the shared value 
of a settlement of normative controversy that enables people who profoundly 
disagree to cooperate toward the realization of common projects, such as 
efficient financial markets and national security.  When lawyers make 
frivolous statutory interpretation arguments in order to narrow the definition of 
the term “torture” to exclude a variety of techniques that would be deemed 
 
 65. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 989 (discussing Rawls’s practical theory of rules in John 
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955)). 
 66. Any theory of obedience to law, however strong, has to have a “safety valve” for legal 
requirements that are so obviously immoral that they cannot represent the resolution of issues on 
which it is possible for people to disagree in good faith.  In my view, it is important to set the 
threshold for opting out of professional obligations at a high level; otherwise all the moral 
disagreement that the law supersedes would be reintroduced as lawyers referred back to ordinary 
moral values to justify their decision not to represent particular clients, or not to take certain legal 
actions on behalf of clients.  See Wendel, supra note 27, at 417 n.190. 
 67. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 1210–32. 
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torture under a good faith interpretation of applicable domestic and 
international law,68 or when they approve structured-finance transactions that 
comply in a superficial way with accounting rules but plainly are not the sorts 
of transactions for which the rules were intended,69 they are treating the law 
with a disrespectful instrumental attitude, not acting as trustees of the law.  
Lawyers may not have greater expertise than their clients or regulators in 
working out, through a process of moral reasoning, the circumstances under 
which it might be permissible to deprive a detainee of sleep in order to obtain 
information that could be used to unwind a terrorist plot.  They do, however, 
have a  considerable comparative advantage in understanding the relevant legal 
norms.  Failing to treat these norms as legitimate sources of reasons that their 
clients must take into account is an ethical failing, with respect to the law.  
This is the sense in which the role of lawyers incorporates both law and ethics. 
The disrespect for the law displayed by the lawyers in the Enron, tax 
shelter, and torture memo cases do not appear out of nowhere.  As legal 
educators, we should ask whether law school somehow creates an attitude of 
“anti-ethics” characterized by “numbness to ethical difficulties of practice, and, 
far worse, a cavalier attitude toward the responsibilities lawyers have to clients 
and the public.”70  Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that some law 
schools do tend to encourage this stance, either through overt disparagement of 
legal ethics or, more commonly, through more subtle signals of the marginality 
of these issues.  Professional responsibility teachers often quote the 
observation of David Luban and Michael Millemann, that their subject is “the 
dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by overworked deans or 
underpaid adjuncts and generally disregarded by the faculty at large.”71  
Students may come to regard the subject as a “dog” long before they enter a 
professional responsibility classroom if they are attentive to the tacit norms of 
the legal academy, which valorizes a certain attitude toward the law, 
particularly “an instrumental approach to law and lawyering [and] a ‘tough-
minded’ and analytical attitude toward legal tasks and professional rules.”72  
Whether they intend to send this message or not, all law teachers, not just those 
who regard themselves as formally teaching professional responsibility, 
convey implicit messages about the way lawyers should interpret and apply the 
 
 68. See Wendel, supra note 25, at 80–85. 
 69. See Wendel, supra note 8, at 1221–24. 
 70. Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of 
Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 154 (1996). 
 71. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37–38 (1995). 
 72. See Cramton, supra note 23, at 248. 
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law to their clients’ situations.73  These signals may be deeply embedded in the 
structure of the law school curriculum, which emphasizes hard cases, the 
indeterminacy of law, and the political basis for judicial decisions.74  Or they 
may be conveyed more overtly, by teachers who adopt the “tough-minded” 
stance of an unreasonably stripped-down rational choice approach.75 
If we hope to counteract the instrumentalist attitude toward the law that 
characterizes the recent legal ethics debacles, professional responsibility 
scholars have to engage with the broader academic and professional 
communities.  My own work in the theory of legal ethics is motivated by the 
conviction that the practice of moral judgment for lawyers acting in a 
representative capacity is categorically different from ordinary moral 
reasoning.  Although I know a bit about philosophical ethical theory, I do not 
claim to be any better at moral reasoning than the average person; I suspect 
most law teachers would feel the same way.  But as lawyers and legal scholars, 
we do have considerable expertise at addressing the technical questions 
presented by our clients legal problems.  To extend the theme of this essay, we 
should not misconceive the nature of the expertise of the subdiscipline of 
professional responsibility teaching.  The aim of professional responsibility 
courses should not be to enhance students’ capacity to exercise reflective moral 
judgment.76  Not only is it difficult to fit all of the complexities of the law 
governing lawyers into a three-hour course, but more to the point, the real 
problem of legal ethics is how to get lawyers to take the law seriously.  
Anything a professional responsibility teacher says in his or her own course 
may be undermined by an implicit message that the law is only instrumentally 
significant, and can be planned around and nullified by a sufficiently clever 
lawyer.  If my colleagues teaching securities law tell students that the lawyers 
representing Enron in its structured-finance deals did nothing wrong, the 
students would take that as a credible statement about what the law allows, and 
the burden would then be upon me as a professional responsibility teacher to 
convince them that they should not assist their client in obtaining a legal 
entitlement.  If my argument were, in effect, that it’s a rotten thing to do, the 
students would justifiably feel that I have no greater expertise than they do 
with respect to figuring out what is a morally rotten thing to do.  If, on the 
other hand, the message is conveyed that the legal arguments employed by the 
 
 73. Susan P. Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118–19 (1995) (arguing that whether law schools acknowledge it or not, 
they teach ethics “pervasively” whenever professors talk about what a lawyer should do). 
 74. See Cramton, supra note 23, at 254–55. 
 75. See W. Bradley Wendel, Symposium Introduction: Economic Rationality vs. Ethical 
Reasonableness: The Relevance of Law and Economics for Legal Ethics, 8 LEGAL ETHICS 107 
(2005) (discussing a review symposium on RANDAL GRAHAM, LEGAL ETHICS (2004)). 
 76. Cf. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 42–43, 
51 (1992). 
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Enron lawyers are lousy legal arguments, we as legal educators are acting 
within the domain of our expertise. 
The arguments presented here may also support expanding efforts to 
incorporate professional responsibility education into clinical settings, where 
students deal simultaneously with the law governing their clients’ problems 
and the law governing their own conduct as lawyers.  It may even be the case 
that the only “real” ethical education occurs in conjunction with students 
imaginatively or actually entering the role of lawyers for real or hypothetical 
clients.  Having said this, however, I do not want to suggest that there is no 
role for the traditional three-credit professional responsibility course.  I only 
insist that we not confuse the role of that course with teaching ethics.  The law 
governing lawyers is an important and interesting subject in its own right, and 
students should not graduate from law school without being able to deal with 
fairly complex conflict of interest, attorney-client privilege, or client-
wrongdoing problems.  As that body of law has grown and matured over the 
last few decades, many law schools have found it helpful to hire specialists in 
the law governing lawyers to teach the required professional responsibility 
course.  This seems like a positive development, and not only because it 
provides job security for a whole cadre of law teachers.  But the law governing 
lawyers is not ethics, and we as legal scholars are right to continue to question 
how ethics is taught.  My goal in this essay is to establish the way in which law 
and ethics interact, and thus to point the way toward a more comprehensive 
approach to teaching professional responsibility. 
 
